Abstract. We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph such that A denotes a set of applicants and P a set of posts. Each applicant a ∈ A has a preference list over the set of his neighbours in G, possibly involving ties. A matching M is any subset of edges from E such that no two edges of M share an endpoint. A rank-maximal matching is one in which the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank one posts, subject to this condition, the maximum number of applicants is matched to their rank two posts and so on. A central authority matches applicants to posts in G using one of rank-maximal matchings. Let a1 be the sole manipulative applicant, who knows the preference lists of all the other applicants and wants to falsify his preference list, so that, he has a chance of getting better posts than if he were truthful, i.e., than if he gave a true preference list. We give three manipulation strategies for a1 in this paper. In the first problem 'best nonfirst', the manipulative applicant a1 wants to ensure that he is never matched to any post worse than the most preferred post among those of rank greater than one and obtainable, when he is truthful. In the second strategy 'min max' the manipulator wants to construct a preference list for a1 such that the worst post he can become matched to by the central authority is best possible or in other words, a1 wants to minimize the maximal rank of a post he can become matched to. To be able to carry out strategy 'best nonfirst', a1 only needs to know the most preferred post of each applicant, whereas putting into effect 'min max' requires the knowledge of whole preference lists of all applicants. The last manipulation strategy 'improve best' guarantees that a1 is matched to his most preferred post at least in some rank-maximal matchings.
Introduction
We consider manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. In the rank-maximal matching problem, we are given a bipartite graph G = (A∪P, E) where A denotes a set of applicants and P a set of posts. Each applicant a ∈ A has a preference list over the set of his neighbours in G, possibly involving ties. Preference lists are represented by ranks on the edges -an edge (a, p) has rank i, denoted as rank(a, p) = i, if post p belongs to one of a's i-th choices. An applicant a prefers a post p to a post p if rank(a, p) < rank(a, p ). In this case, we say that (a, p) has higher rank than (a, p ). If a is indifferent between p and p , then rank(a, p) = rank(a, p ). Posts most preferred by an applicant a have rank one in his preference list. A matching M is any subset of edges E such that no two edges of M share an endpoint. A matching is called a rankmaximal matching if it matches the maximum number of applicants to their rank one posts and subject to this condition, the maximum number of applicants to their rank two posts, and so on. A rank-maximal matching can be computed in O(min(c √ n, n)m) time, where n is the number of applicants, m the number of edges and c the maximum rank of an edge in an optimal solution [20] .
A central authority matches applicants to posts by using the rank-maximal matching algorithm. Since there may be more than one rank-maximal matching of G, we assume that the central authority may choose any one of them arbitrarily. Let a 1 be a manipulative applicant, who knows the preference lists of all the other applicants and wants to falsify his preference list, so that, he has a chance of getting better posts than if he were truthful, i.e., than if he gave a true preference list. We can always assume that a 1 does not get his most preferred post in every rank-maximal matching when he is truthful, otherwise, a 1 does not have any incentive to cheat. Also, we can notice that it is usually advantageous for a 1 to truncate his preference list. Let H p denote the graph, in which a 1 's preference list consists of only one post p. Then as long as no rank-maximal matching of H p leaves a 1 unmatched, he is guaranteed to always get the post p. To cover the worst case situation for a 1 , our strategies require a 1 to provide a full preference list that includes every post from P . Also, a 1 could make the posts, he does not want to be matched to, appear very far in his preference list. Thus, we assume that a 1 does not have any gap in his preference list, i.e., it cannot happen that in a 1 's preference list there are a rank i and rank (i + 2) posts but none of rank (i + 1).
Our Contribution: Our contribution consists in developing manipulation strategies for the rank-maximal matching problem. Given a graph instance with the true preference list of every applicant, we introduce three manipulation strategies for a 1 . We consider the case where a 1 is the sole manipulator in G.
Our first manipulation strategy named 'best nonfirst' is described in Section 3. The strategy may not provide an optimal improvement for a 1 , but it is simple and fast. This strategy guarantees that a 1 is never matched to any post worse than the second best post he can be matched to in a rank-maximal matching, when he is truthful. In other words, if a 1 is matched to a post p when he is truthful and p is not his most preferred post, then the strategy 'best nonfirst' ensures that he is never matched to any post ranked worse than p in any rankmaximal matching. The advantage of this strategy is that a 1 does not need to know full preference lists of the other applicants. He only needs to know the most preferred post of each applicant to be able to successfully execute the strategy.
Next, in Section 5.2 we propose the strategy 'min max'. The strategy minimizes the maximal rank of a post a 1 can become matched to. Thus it optimally improves the worst post of a 1 that is obtainable from the central authority. What is more, the strategy has the property that by using it, a 1 always gets matched to p 1 , which is the best among worst posts he can be matched to. Moreover, we prove that there does not exist a strategy that simultaneously guarantees that a 1 never gets a post worse than p 1 and sometimes gets a post better than p 1 .
Last but not least, we have studied the manipulation strategy 'improve best' in Section 6. The previous two manipulation strategies improve the worst post a 1 can be matched to in a rank-maximal matching. Hence, these strategies may not match a 1 to his most preferred post in any rank maximal matching. In this manipulation strategy, a 1 has a different goal -he wants to be matched to his most preferred post in some rank-maximal matchings. Note that it is not possible for him to ensure that he always gets his most preferred post.
Previous and related work. The rank-maximal matching problem belongs to the class of matching problems with preferences. In the problems with onesided preferences, the considered graph is bipartite and each vertex of only one set of the bipartition expresses preferences over the set of its neighbours. Apart from rank-maximal matchings, other types of matchings from this class include pareto-optimal [1] [28] [5] , popular [3] and fair [15] matchings among others. In the problems with two-sided preferences, the underlying graph is also bipartite but vertices from both sides of the bipartition express preferences over their neighbours. The most famous example of a matching problem with two-sided preferences is that of a stable matching known also as the stable marriage problem. Since the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley [8] , it has been studied very intensively, among others in [12] , [18] , [27] . In the non-bipartite matching problems with preferences each vertex from the graph ranks all of its neighbours. The stable roommate problem [17] is a counterpart of the stable marriage problem in the non-bipartite setting.
The rank-maximal matching problem was first introduced by Irving [19] . A rank-maximal matching can be found via a relatively straightforward reduction to the maximum weight matching problem. The already mentioned [20] gives a combinatorial algorithm that runs in O(min(n, c √ n)m) time. The capacitated and weighted versions were considered, respectively, in [25] and [21] . A switching graph characterization of the set of all rank-maximal matchings is described in [11] . Finally, the dynamic version of the rank-maximal matching problem was considered in [24] and [10] .
A matching problem with preferences is called strategy-proof if it is in the best interest of each applicant to provide their true preference list. An example of a strategy-proof mechanism among matching problems with one-sided preferences is that of a pareto optimal matching. The strategyproofness of a pareto optimal matching has applications in house allocation [16] [2] [30] [22] and kidney exchange [29] [4] . Regarding the stable matching problem, if a stable matching algorithm produces a men-optimal stable matching, then it is not possible for men to gain any advantage by changing or contracting their preference lists and then the best strategy for them is to keep their true preference lists [7] [26].
In the context of matching with preferences cheating strategies were mainly studied for the stable matching problem. Gale and Sotomayor [9] showed that women can shorten their preference lists to force an algorithm, that computes the men-optimal stable matching, to produce the women-optimal stable matching. Teo et al. [31] considered a cheating strategy, where women are required to give a full preference list and one of the women is a manipulator. Huang [13] explored the versions, in which, men can make coalitions. Manipulation strategy in the stable roommate problem was also considered by Huang [14] . For a matching problem with one-sided preferences, Nasre [23] studied manipulation strategies for the popular matching problem.
Background
A matching M is said to be maximum (in a graph G) if, among all matchings of G, it has the maximum number of edges. A path P is said to be alternating with respect to matching M or M -alternating if its edges belong alternately to M and E \ M . A vertex v is unmatched or free in M if it is not incident to any edge of M . An M -alternating path P such that both its endpoints are unmatched in M , is said to be M -augmenting (or augmenting with respect to M ). It was proved by Berge [6] that a matching M is maximum if and only if there exists no M -augmenting path.
We state the following well-known properties of maximum matchings in bipartite graphs. Let G = (A∪P, E) be a bipartite graph and let M be a maximum matching in G. The matching M defines a partition of the vertex set A ∪ P into three disjoint sets. A vertex v ∈ A∪P is even (resp. odd) if there is an even (resp. odd) length alternating path with respect to M from an unmatched vertex to v. A vertex v is unreachable if there is no alternating path from an unmatched vertex to v. The even, odd and unreachable vertices are denoted by E, O and U respectively. The following lemma is well known in matching theory. The proofs can be found in [20] . Lemma 1. Let E, O and U be the sets of vertices defined as above by a maximum matching M in G. Then, 1. E, O and U are pairwise disjoint, and independent of the maximum matching M in G. 2. In any maximum matching of G, every vertex in O is matched with a vertex in E, and every vertex in U is matched with another vertex in U . The size of a maximum matching is |O| + |U |/2. 3. G contains no edge between a vertex in E and a vertex in E ∪ U .
Rank-Maximal Matchings
Next we review an algorithm by Irving et al. [20] for computing a rank-maximal matching. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be an instance of the rank-maximal matching problem. Every edge e = (a, p) has a rank reflecting its position in the preference list of applicant a. E is the union of disjoint sets E i , i.e., E = E 1 ∪ E 2 ∪ E 3 ... ∪ E r , where E i denotes the set of edges of rank i and r denotes the lowest rank of an edge in G. We give a brief description of the algorithm of Irving et al. [20] for computing a rank-maximal matching, whose pseudocode (Algorithm 1) is given below. Let us denote G i = (A ∪ P, E 1 ∪ E 2 ∪ ... ∪ E i ) as a subgraph of G that only contains edges of rank smaller or equal to i. The algorithm runs in phases. The algorithm starts with G 1 = G 1 and a maximum matching M 1 of G 1 . In the first phase, the set of vertices is partitioned into E 1 , O 1 and U 1 . The edges between O 1 and O 1 ∪ U 1 are deleted. Since the vertices incident to O 1 ∪ U 1 have to be matched in G 1 in every rank-maximal matching, the edges of rank greater than 1 incident to such vertices are deleted from the graph G. Next we add the edges of rank 2 and call the resulting graph G 2 . The graph G 2 may contain some M 1 -augmenting paths. We determine the maximum matching M 2 in G 2 by augmenting M 1 . In the i-th phase, the vertices are partitioned into three disjoint sets E(G i ), O(G i ) and U (G i ). We delete every edge between O i and O i ∪ U i . Also, we delete every edge of rank greater than i incident to vertices in O i ∪ U i . Next we add the edges of rank (i + 1) and call the resulting graph G i+1 . We determine the maximum matching M i+1 in G i+1 by augmenting M i . G is also called the reduced graph of G.
Algorithm 1 for computing a rank-maximal matching 1: procedure RankMaximalMatching(G) 2:
Let M1 be any maximum matching of G 1 4:
Partition the vertices of
Delete all edges in Ej (for j > i) which are incident on vertices in
Add the edges in Ei+1 and denote the graph as G i+1 .
9:
Determine a maximum matching Mi+1 in G i+1 by augmenting Mi.
10: return Mr
The following invariants are proved in [20] .
The matching M i is rank-maximal in G i , and is a maximum matching in G i . 3. If a rank-maximal matching in G has signature (s 1 , ..., s i , ...s r ), then M i has signature (s 1 , ..., s i ). 4. The graphs G i , (1 ≤ i ≤ r) are independent of the rank-maximal matching computed by the algorithm.
Lemma 2. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) and G = (A ∪ P, E ) be two bipartite graphs with ranks on the edges. Suppose that E ⊆ E. Also, every edge e ∈ E has the same rank in G and G . Then any rank-maximal matching M of G such that M ⊆ E is also a rank-maximal matching of G .
Proof. Let M be a rank-maximal matching of G. Moreover, we assume that M is a matching of G . Since each edge of E has the same rank in both G and G , the signature of M is the same in both graphs. Therefore the signature of a rank-maximal matching of G is not worse than the signature of a rankmaximal matching of G. Suppose the signature of a rank-maximal matching of G is strictly better than the signature of a rank-maximal matching of G. If M is a rank-maximal matching of G , by the construction of G and G , M is a matching of G and M has the same signature in both G and
Thus M is not a rank-maximal matching of G which is a contradiction.
Properties of a preference list and strategy 'best nonfirst'
Here we note down some properties of the preference list of any applicant. Let us assume that the preference list of a 1 in G has the form (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , . . . , P i , . . . , P t ), where P i denotes the set of posts of rank i in the preference list of a 1 . G \ {a 1 } denotes the graph obtained from G after the removal of the vertex a 1 from G.
We define an f -post of G in a similar way as in the popular matching problem [3] Definition 3. A post is called an f -post of G if and only if it belongs to O(
The remaining posts of G are called non-f -posts.
Lemma 3. If P 1 contains a post that is a non-f -post, then a 1 is always matched to one of such posts in a rank-maximal matching of G and thus to one of his first choices.
Proof. Let M be a maximum matching of G 1 \ {a 1 }. M is a matching of G 1 but not necessarily of maximum size. a 1 is unmatched in M and P 1 contains a post p that is not an f post. Hence, p belongs to E(G 1 \ {a 1 }) and there exists an even length M -alternating path S starting at p and ending at some unmatched vertex p in G 1 \ {a 1 }. Therefore, S together with the edge (a 1 , p)
forms an augmenting path in the graph G 1 . If we apply any such augmenting path we obtain a maximum matching of G 1 and a 1 is matched in every maximum matching of G 1 . Let us also notice that no edge (a 1 , p 1 ) such that p 1 is an f -post from P 1 belongs to an M -augmenting path. This shows that a 1 is matched in every maximum matching of G 1 and to a non-f -post from P 1 . This completes our proof.
Next lemma shows that if a 1 is not matched to a rank one post in some rank-maximal matching of G, then an f -post may be defined in an alternative way that takes into account the whole graph G 1 . This property is needed during the construction of strategy 'min max'. Lemma 4. Let us assume that a 1 is not matched to a rank one post in some rank-maximal matching of G. Then a post is an f -post if and only if it belongs to O(G 1 ) or U (G 1 ).
Proof. We say that a vertex v has the same type in graphs G and
We have assumed that a 1 is not matched to his rank one post in every rank-maximal matching. By the properties of the rank-maximal matchings, a 1 ∈ E(G 1 ). Hence, we can find a maximum matching M of G 1 in which a 1 is an unmatched vertex. Notice that M is a maximum matching of both G 1 and G 1 \ {a 1 }. Hence, a vertex that is reachable from a free vertex other than a 1 in G 1 , has the same type in both G 1 and G 1 \ {a 1 }. The vertices from P that are reachable only from a 1 by an alternating path in G 1 , belong to O(G 1 ). These vertices become unreachable in G 1 \ {a 1 }. Finally an unreachable vertex in G 1 is also an unreachable vertex in G 1 \ {a 1 }. Therefore, a post that belongs to O(G 1 ) or U (G 1 ), is an f -post.
Conversely, let us consider an f -post p. p is either an odd or an unreachable vertex in G 1 \ {a 1 }. Suppose p becomes an even vertex in G 1 . We have proved in the previous part that p must be reachable from vertices other than a 1 . Also we know that a vertex that is reachable from a free vertex other than a 1 in G 1 , has the same type in both G 1 and G 1 \ {a 1 }. Hence, p is an even vertex in G 1 \ {a 1 }, which is a contradiction. Therefore, p is either an odd or an unreachable vertex in G 1 .
The lemma below characterises the set of potential posts a 1 can be matched to, if he provides his true preference list.
Lemma 5. Let G be a bipartite graph and i be the rank of the highest ranked non-f -post in the preference list of a 1 . If a 1 is not matched to a rank one post, then a 1 can only be matched to a post of rank i or greater than i in any rankmaximal matching of G.
Proof. Let M be a rank-maximal matching of G. While computing a rankmaximal matching of G we start by finding a maximum matching of G 1 . Since a 1 is not matched to a rank one post in every rank-maximal matching of G, by Lemma 4, the set of f -posts contains every vertex from O(G 1 ) and U (G 1 ).
Hence, we delete every edge, that has rank bigger than 1, incident to an f -post. Thus, every edge e = (a 1 , p) such that p is an f -post and rank(a, p) > 1 gets deleted after the first iteration of the algorithm. Therefore, no such edge can belong to a rank-maximal matching and a 1 can only be matched to a post of rank i or worse.
The above lemmas provide us with an easy method of manipulation that guarantee that a 1 can always be matched to the best non-f -post in his true preference list. Lemma 5 shows that the most preferred non-f -post of a 1 is ranked not worse than the second most preferred post he can be matched to, when he is truthful. We assume that a 1 is not matched to a rank one post in every rank-maximal matching of G. Otherwise, the manipulator has no incentive to cheat. Let p i ∈ P i be a highest ranked non-f post in the true preference list of a 1 . We put p i as a rank 1 post in the falsified preference list of a 1 . Next, we fill the falsified preference list of a 1 arbitrarily. This completes the description of strategy 'best nonfirst'.
Algorithm 2 Strategy 'best nonfirst'
1: pi ← a highest ranked non-f -post in the true preference list of a1. 
Example of Strategy 'best non-first' Not Being Optimal
We have given a strategy 'best nonfirst' in the previous part of the paper. But that strategy may not be optimal in the sense that the manipulator may arrange to get a post of even better rank. Let us consider an example from Figure 1 . Let us assume that a 1 is a manipulator. The first preference table contains true preference list of all applicants a 1 , . . . , a 6 . a 1 is matched to p 5 in every rankmaximal matching of this instance. p 3 is the best non-f -post in the preference list of a 1 . The second preference table contains a falsified preference list of a 1 . Here a 1 adopted the strategy 'best nonfirst' and as a result he is matched to p 3 in every rank-maximal matching. We can fill the rest of the preference list of a 1 arbitrarily. Consider now the third preference table, in which a 1 falsifies his preference list in yet another way. By presenting this falsified preference list a 1 contrives to get matched to p 2 in every rank-maximal matching. Post p 2 is also his true first choice. Hence getting matched to p 3 is not an optimal strategy for a 1 . The example in the previous section clearly shws that the strategy 'best nonfirst' may not provide an optimal solution. In this section we introduce the strategy 'min max' that optimizes the worst post a 1 can be matched to in a rank-maximal matching.
Critical Rank
The notion that is going to be very useful while constructing a preference list is that of a critical rank.
Definition 4. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph with ranks on the edges belonging to {1, 2, . . . , r}. Suppose that a ∈ A, p ∈ P and (a, p) does not belong to E. Let H = (A ∪ P, E ∪ {(a, p)}). We define a critical rank of (a, p) in H as follows.
If there exists a natural number
Otherwise, the critical rank of (a, p) is defined as r + 1.
The next lemma reveals an interesting property of the critical rank of an edge (a, p).
Lemma 6. Let G, H and (a, p) be as in Definition 4. Then the critical rank of (a,
Proof. We start by proving the following claim.
Claim. Suppose that e = (a, p) has rank i in the graph H. Then (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of H i if and only if for every j ≤ i both a ∈ E(G j ) and p ∈ E(G j ).
Since (a, p) has rank i in H and G differs from H only by the existence of the edge (a, p), we know that the reduced graphs G j and H j are the same for each j < i. Also, the reduced graphs H i and G i may be the same or differ by the existence of the edge e.
If for some
, then the edge (a, p) does not belong to H i , because it is removed at the beginning of phase j + 1 during the computation of a rank-maximal matching of H. Thus in this case e does not belong to any rank-maximal matching of H i . If for every j < i, a ∈ E(G j ) and p ∈ E(G j ) and
, then e belongs to H i , but there exists a rank-maximal matching of H i that does not contain e. This is so because the addition of e to G i does not create any augmenting path in H i , therefore a maximum matching of G i is also a maximum matching of H i and thus a rank-maximal matching of H i . This shows that in this case every rank-maximal matching of G i is also rank-maximal in H i . Hence, there exists a rank-maximal matching of H i that does not contain (a, p).
Assume now that for every j ≤ i both a ∈ E(G j ) and p ∈ E(G j ). This means that the reduced graph H i does contain (a, p). Any rank-maximal matching of H i is a maximum matching of H i . Let M i denote a maximum matching of G i . Since a ∈ E(G i ) and p ∈ E(G i ), (a, p) belongs to every M i -augmenting path -because a is the endpoint of some even length M i -alternating path ending at a free vertex a ∈ A and similarly, p is the endpoint of some even length M ialternating path ending at a free vertex p ∈ P . Together with (a, p) these paths form an M i -augmenting path in H i . Additionally, we notice that (a, p) belongs to every M i -augmenting path and thus to every maximum matching of H i and hence to every rank-maximal matching of H i .
Let us now prove the other direction of the claim and suppose that (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of H i . This means that (a, p) belongs to every maximum matching of H i . Then (a, p) must be contained in H i and by the above arguments, we know that for every j < i both a ∈ E(G j ) and p ∈ E(G j ). No maximum matching of G i contains (a, p) -therefore a maximum matching of H i must be bigger by one than a maximum matching of G i . This means that (a, p) must belong to a path augmenting with respect to a maximum matching of G i , which means that the endpoints of (a, p) belong to E(G i ). This way we have proved the claim.
The claim, which we have just proved, shows that if (i) for every 1 ≤ i < c the edge (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of H i , in which (a, p) has rank i and (ii) there exists a rank-maximal matching M of H c , in which (a, p) has rank c such that (a, p) is not contained in M , then c = min{i : (O(G i ) ∪ U (G i )) ∩ {a, p} = ∅} and hence, c is the critical rank of (a, p).
The claim also shows that if c is the critical rank of (a, p), then for every i < c the edge (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of H i , in which (a, p) has rank i and there exists a rank-maximal matching of H c , in which (a, p) has rank c that does not contain (a, p). It remains to prove that if c is the critical rank of (a, p), then for every c < i ≤ r the edge (a, p) belongs to no rank-maximal matching of H i , in which (a, p) has rank i. This follows from the fact that any edge of rank i > c incident to a vertex belonging to O(H c ) ∪ U (H c ) is removed from H i and therefore cannot belong to a maximum matching of H i and thus cannot be present in any rank-maximal matching of H i . This ends the proof of the lemma.
Corollary 1. The critical rank of an edge incident to an f -post of G is 1 in G.
The next two lemmas explain the change of the critical rank of (a, p) when we add an f -post p as a rank 1 post to the preference list of a.
Lemma 7. Let G be a bipartite graph and a be an applicant. Let p be the only post in the preference list of a. Suppose that the critical rank of (a, p) is c in G. LetĜ = G ∪ {(a, p )} where p is a rank 1, f -post in the preference list of a. Then the critical rank of (a, p) is at most c inĜ.
Proof. It suffices to show that (a, p) is not matched in every rank-maximal matching ofĜ c with (a, p) having rank c and for every c < i ≤ r no rankmaximal matching ofĜ, in which (a, p) has rank i contains (a, p).
Suppose, (a, p) is matched in every rank-maximal matching ofĜ c . If M is a matching ofĜ c , by Lemma 2, M is also a rank-maximal matching of G. Since the critical rank of (a, p) is c in G, there exists a rank-maximal matching M of G c that does not contain the edge (a, p). The signature of M and M is the same. Hence M is a rank-maximal matching ofĜ c , which is a contradiction.
To prove the second part, suppose to the contrary that there exists rankmaximal matching M ofĜ, in which (a, p) has rank i that contains (a, p). Then M is also a matching of G and by Lemma 2 it is also a rank-maximal matching of G. However, by Lemma 6 no rank-maximal matching of G, in which (a, p) has rank i > c can contain (a, p) -a contradiction.
Lemma 8. Let G = (A ∪ P, E) be a bipartite graph, in which a has two neighbors p and p such that apart from (a, p), each edge has a rank belonging to {1, 2, . . . , r}. Additionally, p is a rank one f -post in the preference list of a. Let G = (A ∪ P, E \ {(a, p)}) and G = (A ∪ P, E \ {(a, p )}). Suppose that a becomes unreachable in G i and the critical rank of (a, p) is c in G . Then the critical rank of (a, p) in the graph G is equal to, correspondingly:
Proof. We can prove that for every j < i there exists a rank-maximal matching of G j that contains (a, p ) and there exists a rank-maximal matching of G j that does not contain (a, p ).
Claim. Let us suppose that (a, p) has rank c < i in G. Then, the existence of a rank-maximal matching M of G that does not contain (a, p) implies that the critical rank of (a, p) in G is at most c .
Proof. By Lemma 2, M is a rank-maximal matching of G and hence, every rank-maximal matching of G is also rank-maximal in G. We know that there exists a rank-maximal matching M of G that does not contain (a, p ). Thus a is unmatched in M . By Fact 2, M is also a rank-maximal matching of G . M does not contain (a, p), which shows that the critical rank of (a, p) is at most c in G .
First we assume that c ≤ i. Since G is a subgraph of G, by Lemma 7, the critical rank of (a, p) ≤ c in G. Suppose the critical rank of (a, p) = c < c in G. Let us consider a graph G, in which (a, p) has rank c . Since the critical rank of (a, p) is equal to c , there exists a rank-maximal matching M of G that does not contain (a, p). By the above claim, the critical rank of (a, p) in G is at most c < c -a contradiction. We conclude that the critical rank of (a, p) remains c in G if c ≤ i.
Let us consider now the case when c > i. First we show that the critical rank of (a, p) ≤ i in G. Let us consider the graph G . The vertex a becomes unreachable in G after iteration i. We know that G = G ∪ {(a, p)}. Hence, the edge (a, p) is deleted in the graph G if the rank of (a, p) > i in G. Therefore, the critical rank of (a, p) ≤ i in G.
Next we show that the critical rank of (a, p) = i in G. Suppose the critical rank of (a, p) equals i < i in G. Since the critical rank of (a, p) is equal to i < i, there exists a rank-maximal matching M of G, in which (a, p) has rank i that does not contain (a, p). Again by the claim, the critical rank of (a, p) in G is at most i < c -a contradiction. Therefore we have proved that the critical rank of (a, p) is equal to i in G.
Corollary 2. Let G be a bipartite graph such that p is a rank one, f -post in the preference list of a. Suppose that a becomes unreachable after iteration i. Let G = G ∪ {(a, p)} with the rank of the edge (a, p) being c. Then (a, p) is never matched in a rank-maximal matching ofĜ, if c > i.
The next lemma is useful while building a falsified preference list of a using the strategy 'min max'. This lemma basically combines two short preference lists of a into a longer preference list.
Lemma 9. Let us consider two bipartite graphs G 1 and G 2 such that p is a rank one, f -post in the preference list of a in both graphs. Also a has only two neighbors in each of the graphs. In G 1 , a has p 1 as a rank i post. In G 2 , a has p 2 as a rank j post. We assume that G 3 is the union of graphs G 1 and G 2 . Then a is matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of both G 1 and G 2 if and only if a is matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of G 3 .
Proof. Assume that a is matched to p 1 in a rank-maximal matching M of G 3 . M is also a matching in the graph G 1 . Since G 1 is a subgraph of G 3 , from the fact 2, M is a rank-maximal matching of G 1 . This means that a is matched to p 1 in some rank-maximal matchings of G 1 , which is a contradiction.
Conversely, let a be matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of G 3 . Let M 3 be a rank-maximal matching of G 3 . Without loss of generality, suppose that a is matched to p 1 in a rank-maximal matching M 1 of G 1 . Since G 1 is a subgraph of G 3 , from fact 2, M 3 is a rank-maximal matching of G 1 . Thus, M 1 and M 3 have the same signature. Therefore, M 1 is a rank-maximal matching of G 3 , which is a contradiction.
Algorithm for Strategy 'min max'
In this section, we give an algorithm that computes a graph H by using the strategy 'min max' for the applicant a 1 . We recall that strategy 'min max' consists in finding a full preference list for a 1 such that the maximal rank of a post he can obtain is minimized. Since we have assumed that a 1 is not always matched to his first choice when he is truthful and since strategy 'best nonfirst' ensures that a 1 always gets the highest ranked non-f -post, it remains to check if it is possible for a 1 to get one of the f -posts in every rank-maximal matching. For a given f -post p we want to verify if a 1 can construct a full preference list that guarantees that a becomes matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of the resultant graph. From all such f -posts, we want to choose that of the highest rank in the true preference list of a 1 . Below we show that this way we indeed compute the strategy 'min max'.
Let p be an f -post that a 1 wants to be matched to in every rank-maximal matching of H p , where H p contains a full falsified preference list of a 1 . How do we construct such H p ? LetĤ p denote the graph, in which a 1 is incident only to p and (a 1 , p) has rank one. By Lemma 9, we know that in order to obtain H p , it suffices to find a certain number of graphs H p,pj such that p and p j are the only posts in the preference list of a 1 , p has rank 1, p j has rank j > 1 and every rank-maximal matching of H p,pj matches a 1 to p. Then we can combine those graphs into one graph H p . In fact, it suffices to fill the preference list of a 1 only till rank k, where k is the rank, when a 1 becomes an unreachable vertex in H p,i . This follows from Corollary 2, which says that no rank-maximal matching of H p,p such that (a 1 , p ) has rank i > k contains (a 1 , p ) . Therefore, the ranks greater than k in the preference list of a 1 may be filled with arbitrary posts not occurring previously.
Suppose that we want to find a "good" post for rank i < k in the preference list of a 1 . First, we check if there is any available post p such that the critical rank of (a 1 , p ) is smaller than i in H p,p . If we find such a post, then by Lemma 6, the edge (a 1 , p ) never occurs in a rank-maximal matching of H p,p in which (a 1 , p ) has rank i. Therefore, we may add p to the preference list of a 1 as a rank i post. Otherwise, we consider a post p with critical rank i in the graph H p,p . We verify if p is matched to a 1 in every rank-maximal matching, when we add (a 1 , p ) as a rank i edge to the graphĤ p . If yes, then we put p as an ith choice in H p . If not, we check another post with critical rank i. If we are unable to find any post for rank i, Algorithm 3 outputs that there does not exist any preference list that matches a 1 to p in every rank-maximal matching of H p .
The algorithm that computes a graph H p , if it exists, is given below as Algorithm 3. The thing that still requires explanation is how we verify if (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of H p,p . For this, we need the reduced graph of H p,p from phase r, which we can obtain by either applying the standard rank-maximal matching algorithm [20] or we can use one of the dynamic algorithms [10] [24] if we want to have a faster algorithm. Once we have access to this reduced graph of H p,p we can use the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let G be an instance of the rank-maximal matching problem, in which the maximal rank of an edge is r. Also, we assume that M is a fixed rankmaximal matching of G that matches an edge (a, p). Let us consider the switching graph of the matching M in G. Then the edge (a, p) belongs to every rankmaximal matching of G if there does not exist any switching path or switching cycle in the switching graph of M that contains the vertex p.
Proof. Let us fix a rank-maximal matching M of G that matches the edge (a, p). Theorem 1 from [11] states that every rank-maximal matching G can be obtained from M by applying some vertex-disjoint switching paths and switching cycles in the switching graph of M . If there does not exist any switching path or switching cycle containing the vertex p, p has the same partner in every rank-maximal matching of G. Therefore, (a, p) is matched in every rank-maximal matching of G.
Definition 5. We say that an f -post p is feasible if there exists a graph H p such that every rank-maximal matching of H p matches a 1 to p.
In the lemma below we prove the correctness of Algorithm 3.
Lemma 11. If Algorithm 3 outputs a graph H p , then every rank-maximal matching of H p matches a 1 to p. Otherwise, there does not exist a graph H p , in which a 1 gives a full preference list such that every rank-maximal matching of H p matches a 1 to p.
Proof. If Algorithm 3 outputs a graph H p , then by Corollary 2 and Lemma 9 every rank-maximal matching of H p matches a 1 to p. If the algorithm does not output any graph, then it means that there was a problem for some i with finding Algorithm 3 Construction of H p 1: Ci ← {p ∈ P : the critical rank of (a1, p ) in H p,p equals i} 2: L ← an empty list -L is the falsified preference list of a1 that is going to have the form (p1, p2, ..., pn), where pi denotes the rank i post in L. 3: add p to L -this is the rank 1 post in the preference list L of a1 4: k ← the number of phase when a1 becomes unreachable inĤp, i.e., a1 ∈ U (Ĥ p,k ) and a1 ∈ E(Ĥ p,i) for every i < k, whereĤ p,i is the i-th reduced graph ofĤp. 5: C ← C1 6: for i = 2, . . . , k do 7:
if C = ∅ then (there exists a post p in C) 8: add p as a rank i post to the falsified preference list L of a1 9:
C ← C \ {p } 10:
else (C = ∅) 11:
SEARCH ← T RU E 12:
while ∃p with critical rank of (a, p ) equal to i inĤp and SEARCH do 13:
if (a, p) belongs to every rank-maximal matching of H p,p (Lemma 10) then 14: add p as a rank i post to the falsified preference list L of a1 15:
SEARCH ← F ALSE 16:
if SEARCH then Break 17:
C ← C ∪ Ci 18: if L is a full preference list then 19: return Hp 20: else 21: return p is not a feasible f -post a rank i post for the preference list of a 1 . However, the algorithm considers every available post p of critical rank at most i in H p,p for that position. Therefore, if none of them has the required property that every rank-maximal matching of H p,p matches a 1 to p, then no post of critical rank greater than i in H p,p satisfies it either. This finishes the proof of correctness of Algorithm 3.
Theorem 2. Let p be the highest ranked feasible f -post in the true preference list of a 1 . Then H p output by Algorithm 3 is a strategy 'min max'. Moreover, each graph H that is a strategy 'min max' has the property that each rank-maximal matching of H matches a 1 to p.
Proof. Let H opt denote a graph that is a strategy 'min max'. Suppose that H p is not a strategy 'min max'. There exists then a post p such that rank(a 1 , p ) < rank(a 1 , p) in the true preference list of a 1 and (a 1 , p ) belongs to some rankmaximal matching of H opt . Since rank(a 1 , p ) < rank(a 1 , p) in the true preference list of a 1 , p is an f -post. Also, a 1 can only be matched to a post of rank not worse than rank(a 1 , p) in the true preference list of a 1 in a rank-maximal matching of H opt , otherwise H opt would not be a strategy 'min max' because it would fare worse than the strategy H p in terms of the worst post a 1 can become matched to. This means that a 1 can only be matched to f -posts under strategy H opt , because every non-f -post has a worse rank than the rank of post p in the preference list of a 1 . Corollary 1 shows that the critical rank of an f -post is 1. Hence, a 1 can only be matched to a post that has rank 1 in H opt . Therefore, we can only put p as a rank 1 post in the preference list of a 1 in H opt . Now we will show how to build a preference list of a 1 without any ties that matches a 1 to p in every rank-maximal matching. Let us denote this graph as H mod . We put p as a rank 1 post. We create the preference list of a 1 in H mod using the preference list of a 1 in H opt . Suppose we want to add a rank i post to the preference list of a 1 in H mod . If there is only one rank i post in the preference list of a 1 in H opt , then that post will have the same rank in the preference list of a 1 in H mod . If there is more than one rank i posts in the preference list of a 1 in H opt , we choose only one of them. Finally, we add the remaining posts to a 1 's preference list in H mod in an arbitrary order as his least preferred posts. This way we get a preference list without any ties. First, we show that H mod and H opt have the same signature. A rank-maximal matching in H opt that matches a to p is a matching in H mod and has the same signature. Thus a rank-maximal matching of H opt does not have a better signature than a rank-maximal matching of H mod . Also, any post in the preference list of a 1 has rank in H opt that is not worse than in H mod . If we consider a rankmaximal matching of H mod , then the signature of that matching is not worse in H opt . Therefore rank-maximal matchings of H opt and H mod have the same signature.
Next we want to prove that a 1 is matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of H mod . Suppose that a 1 is matched to some p in a rank-maximal matching M of H mod . We can see that M is a matching in H opt . The rank of p in the preference list of a 1 in H opt is not worse than the rank of p in the preference list of a 1 in H mod . This shows that the signature of the matching M in H opt is not worse than the signature of M in H mod . But we know that the signatures of rank-maximal matching of H opt and H mod are the same. Hence, M is a rank-maximal matching of H opt . This implies that a 1 is matched to p in a rank-maximal matching of H opt too.
The preference list of a 1 in H mod does not contain any ties, which means that p is not a rank 1 post in the preference list of a 1 in H mod . We know that the critical rank of an f -post is 1. Therefore p is not an f -post. But a 1 cannot be matched to a non-f -post in H opt -a contradiction. This proves that a 1 is matched to p in every rank-maximal matching of H mod . Lemma 9 shows that Algorithm 3 could also create the same preference list because it would consider each graph H p,pi such that p i has rank i in H mod . Since the rank of (a 1 , p ) is strictly better than the rank of (a 1 , p) in the true preference list of a 1 , it means that p is not a highest rank feasible f -post -a contradiction. Therefore H p is indeed a strategy 'min max'. Also, by the construction of H mod we have shown that each graph H that is a strategy 'min max' has the property that each rankmaximal matching of H matches a 1 to the same post.
'Improve Best' Strategy
In the previous section, we present an optimal algorithm for the manipulation strategy 'min max'. Also, we have shown that 'min max' strategy matches a 1 to the same post in every rank-maximal matching. There is a possibility that a 1 may not be matched to his most preferred post in any rank-maximal matching by using 'min max' strategy. Therefore, a natural question is whether there is a manipulation strategy that matches a 1 to his most preferred post in at least one rank-maximal matching. Here we present a strategy that matches a 1 to his most preferred post in some rank-maximal matchings.
Lemma 12. Let G be a bipartite graph and a, a be two applicants with identical preference list. If (a, p) is matched in a rank-maximal matching of G then the edge (a , p) is present in the reduced graph of G.
Proof. Let (a, p) is matched in G. If we swap the partners of a and a , we get another matching in G. Since the preference list of a and a are identical, the signature of both matchings is the same. Hence, there exists a rank-maximal matching that matches the edge (a , p). Thus (a , p) is present in the reduced graph of G.
Strategy
Here we give a brief description of the strategy 'improve best' for a 1 . We assume that p 1 is the most preferred post in the preference list of a 1 . Given a bipartite graph containing the true preference list of every applicant and a rankmaximal matching, we apply the decremental dynamic rank-maximal matching algorithm [10] to delete a 1 from the graph. Let us denote the updated graph as G. First, we check which applicant is matched to p 1 in G. Suppose p 1 is matched to a 1 in G. a 1 copies the preference list of a 1 and present it as his falsified preference list. Let H be the graph with the falsified preference list of a 1 . We claim that (a 1 , p 1 ) is a rank-maximal pair in H when he uses this strategy. In other words, a 1 is matched to p 1 in some rank-maximal matchings of H.
Correctness
We assume that there is a rank-maximal matching of G that matches the edge (a 1 , p 1 ). We apply the incremental rank-maximal matching algorithm to get a rank-maximal matching of H. If we consider the vertex a 1 in H, there are two possibilities. In the first case, let a 1 be matched to p 1 in H. Without loss of generality, we assume that a 1 is matched to p 1 in H. Now consider another matching of H by swapping the partners of a 1 and a 1 . Since a 1 and a 1 has the identical preference list, both matchings have the same signature. Hence (a 1 , p 1 ) is a rank-maximal pair of H. In the other case, we assume that (a 1 , p 1 ) is not a , we get a rank-maximal matching of H from G by applying an alternating path starting from a 1 (Firgure 2). Since (a 1 , p 1 ) is not matched in H, the alternating path contains the edge (a 1 , p 1 ). Suppose, a rank i post p i (resp. rank k post p k ) is matched to a 1 (resp. a 1 ) in H. By Lemma 12, the edges (a 1 , p k ) and (a 1 , p i ) are also present in the reduced graph of H. Therefore, the path segment a 1 → p i → · · · → p 1 → a 1 → p k together with the edge (a 1 , p k ) creates an alternating cycle in the reduced graph of H. Any alternating cycle in a reduced graph is a switching cycle [11] . If we switch along the alternating cycle in H, (a 1 , p 1 ) becomes a matched edge in H. Now we have arrived at the first case. Therefore we have proved that (a 1 , p 1 ) is a rank-maximal pair in H.
